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ASSESSING INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
ADJUDICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
ATROCITIES
Diane Marie Amann*
We meet just days after U.S. President William J. Clinton decided to sign
the treaty that would establish the International Criminal Court (ICC).' With
this action, the United States joined a number of countries that rushed to sign
before December 31, 2000, and so to continue to help shape the court. They
included states like Yemen, Iran, and Israel.2 These three, along with the
United States, were among the few that had refused to vote in favor of the
treaty when it was adopted at a diplomatic conference in Rome in 1998. By
the end of 2000, 139 states, out of the 189 states in the United Nations, had
signed the Rome Treaty. Twenty-seven had ratified, nearly half the sixty
needed for the treaty to enter into force. 3 That means it is increasingly likely
that the ICC will some day come into being.
The Rome Treaty calls for creation of a permanent, international court,
which will hear cases of individuals charged with most serious crimes:
crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes, and, perhaps later,
aggression. It will operate prospectively; that is, only persons suspected of
committing crimes after the court has begun may be haled before it. It will
sit at The Hague, but its jurisdiction will be global.
These developments make my own topic extremely timely. It is
whether, and to what extent, international criminal adjudication is the
appropriate method for redressing human rights atrocities. Now is an apt
time to ask such questions, not only because of the landmark movement
toward an ICC, but also because of the predecessors of the ICC that have
Professor of Law, University of California, Davis; B.S., 1979, University of Illinois;
M.A., 1981, University of California, Los Angeles; J.D., 1986, Northwestern University. I wish to
thank Gwen K. Young for invaluable research assistance. These remarks were presented on
January 5, 2001, as part of a panel on international criminal adjudication at a conference entitled
"Into the 21st Century: Reconstruction and Reparations" in Cape Town, South Africa.
I See Steven Lee Myers, U.S. Signs Treaty for World Court to Try Atrocities, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 1, 2001, at Al; see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. No.
A/CONF.183/9 (July 17,1998) [hereinafter ICC Statute].
2 See CICC International Criminal Court Home Page, at http://www.igc.org/icc/Rome/
html /ratify.htm (visited Jan. 19,2001) (listing Iran, Israel, and Yemen as signatories).
3 See id. (stating number of states who had signed or ratified by end of 2000); the UN in
Brief at http://www.un.org/Overview/brief.html (visited Feb. 20, 2001) (stating number of
U.N. members). See also ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 126 (stating number of ratifications
needed).
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come into being in the last decade. For the first time since the immediate
post-World War II period, ad hoc tribunals are adjudicating international
crimes - crimes that, even if they occur within one state's borders, offend the
international community. Thus the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda has considered charges arising out of the 1994 massacres in
Rwanda, and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
charges stemming from the protracted conflict in the Balkans.4 Other
tribunals have been proposed: one for Sierra Leone, one for East Timor, and
one for Cambodia.5
Why this sudden influx of international criminal law enforcement?
There is a perception that atrocities have increased, coupled with a demand
for accountability. Why? Since World War II, military and paramilitary
forces engaged in so-called low-level conflicts have committed mass killings
and genocide, systematic rapes, torture, and abductions. CNN carries, to my
home in California and to this hotel in Cape Town, disturbing images.
Images of child soldiers carrying AK-47s. Images of malnourished refugees.
Images of amputated mothers struggling to hold their babies. Images that
provoke response. Similar images surely existed a century ago, but fewer
people saw them, and those who did had fewer tools to insist that something
be done.6 Today, we see more and insist more. Thus we begin to realize the
promise of the human rights movement: that when individuals or states
commit certain offenses, even against their own people, the international
community will take action.7
See Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th
Sess., 3453d mtg., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598 (1994); Statute
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th
Sess., 3217th mtg., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), reprinted in 32 lL.M. 1159 (1993).
5 See Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra
Leone, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (2000); David Lamb, Cambodia Moves to
Create a Tribunal on Khmer Rouge, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2001, at Al; Nora Boustany, East Timorese
Leader Encourages U.S. Role in Volatile Indonesia, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 2000, at A20.
6 On earlier efforts to mobilize public outrage against atrocities, see ADAM
HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD'S GHOST 164-66 (1998) (describing campaign against acts of Belgian
colonizers in Congo); Dominique Marshall, The Construction of Children as an Object of
International Relations: The Declaration of Children's Rights and the Child Welfare Committee of League
of Nations, 1900-1924, 7 INT'L J. CHILDREN'S RTS. 103, 131-37 (1999) (stating that "new techniques
of propaganda" helped early twentieth century activists use examples of children's suffering
during World War I to campaign for international recognition of children's rights).
7 See Regina v. Bartle (H.L. Mar. 24, 1999) (Millett, J.), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 581, 649
(1999) (stating that, by the latter part of the twentieth century, how "a state treated its own
citizens within its own borders had become a matter of legitimate concern to the international
community").
HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES
Action has been taken in the international criminal tribunals. Action also
has been taken in transnational litigation, as evidenced by the criminal
proceedings brought in Spain against former Chilean dictator Augusto
Pinochet, by those brought in Senegal against former Chadian dictator
Hissone Habrd, and by those brought in Belgium against former Congolese
Foreign Minister Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi.8 In addition, there are
national prosecutions for international crimes. Rwandan courts try persons
alleged to have committed genocide in 1994.9 In South Africa some
individuals have been denied amnesty and subjected to national criminal
process for crimes of apartheid. 10 My paper concentrates on international
criminal adjudication, though its considerations apply to all instances in
which criminal process is used or contemplated for dealing with human
rights atrocities.
When people talk about international criminal adjudication, they make
many claims about its functions and purposes. An early example came, not
surprisingly, from Niirnberg. It occurred in the second sentence of the
opening statement of Justice Robert H. Jackson, who was the chief U.S.
prosecutor at the first trial at Ntirnberg. He told the judges: "The wrongs
which we seek to condemn and punish have been so calculated, so
malignant, and so devastating, that civilization cannot tolerate their being
ignored, because it cannot survive their being repeated.""l
What do we find in this passage? We find Jackson suggesting that
international criminal adjudication would enable retribution, would
"condemn and punish" the people responsible, would give them their just
deserts. Jackson contended that failing to do so would invite recurrence of
8 See Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the
Congo v. Belgium) (Order on Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures), No. 121
(Dec. 8, 2000), at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/iCOBEorders/icobejorder_
provisional_measure_20001208.hni (visited Jan. 19, 2001) (rejecting Congo's provisional request
for annulment of international arrest warrant, but reserving ruling on merits of warrant); Bartle,
supra note 7 (opinion of Browne-Wilkinson, J.), reprinted in 38 IL.M. at 583-85 (describing
Spanish efforts to effect Pinochet's extradition); Douglas Farah, Chad's Torture Victims Pursue
Habre in Court, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2000, at A12 (describing aborted Senegalese proceedings
and subsequent suits within Chad).
9 See Stephen Bucdey, Rwandan Suspects Face Trial and Error, WAsH. PosT, Jan. 29, 1997,
at A15.
10 See John Dugard, Reconciliation and Justice: The South African Experience, 8 TRANSNAT'L
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 277, 300 (1998) (referring to cases in which denial of amnesty led to
continuation of criminal process).
11 Opening Statement of Justice Jackson (Nov. 21, 1945) in 2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 98-99 (1948) [hereinafter Jackson
Statement].
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the wrongs committed, and that civil society could not withstand such
recurrence. Conversely, Jackson implied, the acts of prosecution and
punishment could help society to reconstruct itself in a civilized manner.
Holding perpetrators accountable could offer a type of redress to victims and
even deter wrongdoing. In that vision of a new society, one that will not
brook impunity, we may detect a notion that international criminal
adjudication is a way to sustain peace.
These goals - retribution, deterrence, redress, and pacification - are even
more explicit in the opinions emanating from the current international
criminal tribunals. Tribunal judges assume that their work will effect
retribution. 2  Some wax eloquently on their deterrence role. Thus the
Rwanda Tribunal wrote that its efforts must be aimed at "dissuading for
good those who will attempt in the future to perpetrate such atrocities by
showing them that the-international community was not ready to tolerate the
serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights."'13
Similarly, the Yugoslavia Tribunal wrote that the jus cogens norm against
torture "is designed to produce a deterrent effect, in that it signals to all
members of the international community and the individuals over whom
they wield authority that the prohibition of torture is an absolute value from
which nobody must deviate."' 4
With regard to its duties to victims of atrocities, judges on the Yugoslavia
Tribunal placed themselves within "the realm of international humanitarian
law which has, as one of its prime objectives, the protection of the weak and
vulnerable in such a situation where their lives and security are
endangered." 5
12 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgement, para. 288 (Dec.
10, 1998), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 317, 374 (1999) (stating that it is "right that punitur quia peccatur
(the individual must be punished because he broke the law)" and that retribution is one of two
important functions of punishment); Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, para. 28
(Sept. 4, 1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 1411, 1419 (1998) (stating that "retribution of the said
accused, who must see their crimes punished," is a key role).
13 Kainbanda, supra note 12, para. 28, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. at 1419.
14 Furundzija, supra note 12, para. 154, reprinted in 38 I.L.M. at 349.
is Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Appeals Chamber Judgement, para. 75
(Oct. 7, 1997) (Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah), at
http://www.un.org/erdemovic/appeal/judgement/erd-asojmcd971007e.htm (visited Feb. 20,
2001).
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According to another opinion, international criminal proceedings
"contribute to appeasement and give the chance to the people who were
sorely afflicted to mourn." 16
These consequences are deemed to promote peace. The Yugoslavia
Tribunal has proclaimed that part of its ",unique mandate" from the U.N.
Security Council is "contributing to the restoration and maintenance of the
peace .... "17 Likewise, the Rwanda Tribunal has stated that it was
established to "contribute to the process of national reconciliation and the
restoration and maintenance of peace." 18
Can international criminal adjudication fulfill these promises? Alone,
no.
Retribution will of course be visited on anyone whom an international
criminal tribunal convicts and incarcerates. The reach of retribution is
limited, however, by the random nature of international criminal
adjudication. The Rwanda Tribunal has had some success in bringing
governmental officials to justice. But the first defendant tried by the
Yugoslavia Tribunal, Dusko Tadic, was little more than a free-lance thug.19
The tribunal devoted years to his case, while indicted Serbs of high rank
roamed free. Though some of the latter group now have faced international
prosecution, it is not today apparent that former Bosnian Serb leaders
Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, or former Serbian President Slobodan
16 Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22, Sentencing Judgement, para. 65 (Nov. 29,
1996), at http://www.un.org/erdemovic/trialc/judgement/erd-tsj961129e.htm (visited Feb. 20,
2001) [hereinafter Erdemovic Sentencing Judgement]. Accord Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No.
ICTR 98-39-S, para. 19 (Feb. 5,1999), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 854, 857 (1999) (stating that one of the
tribunal's purposes is to ensure redress of violations of international humanitarian law).
17 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Sentencing Judgment, para. 7 (Nov. 11, 1999),
reprinted in 39 I.L.M. 117, 120 (2000); see also Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10, Judgement,
para. 116 (Dec. 14, 1999), at http://www.un.org/icty/brcko/trialcl/judgement/index.htm
(visited Feb. 20,2001).
is See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, § 1.1, para. 2 (Sept.
2, 1998), at http://www.ictr.org/ (visited Feb. 20, 2001); Serushago, supra note 16, para. 19,
reprinted in 38 I.L.M. at 857.
19 See Charles Trueheart, U.N. Tribunal Finds Bosnian Serb Guilty, WASH. POST, May 8,
1997, at A20 (describing Tadic as a "police reservist").
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Milosevic, will appear before the tribunal.20 This record of randomness
cannot satisfy those who hope to give those most culpable their just deserts. 21
Randomness, and its relative, selectivity, also frustrate the goal of
deterrence. Specific deterrence, which uses condemnation and punishment
to hinder particular individuals from repeating their crimes, has minimal
effect because few suspects will suffer punishment at the hands of
international criminal tribunals. General deterrence, meanwhile, occurs only
if condemnation and punishment of some individuals can persuade others
not to commit the same crimes. Even in comprehensive, fully operative,
domestic criminal justice systems, only a small fraction of perpetrators is
selected for prosecution and punishment.22
The numbers are too small to make a rational wrongdoer hesitate. That
reality is compounded in the international arena, where lack of resources and
political considerations tend to preclude prosecution of all but a few
individuals. Even with the Nidrnberg trial and the many similar trials that
succeeded it, it is estimated that no more than 3.5 percent of all suspected
German war criminals ever faced prosecution.23
Can international criminal adjudication recompense, repair, help
victims? The problems of randomness and selectivity confound this goal as
well. They make it less likely that a victim will ever see the specific
individual who harmed that victim brought to justice. Furthermore,
international criminal tribunals, like criminal courts in common-law
jurisdictions, are structured to limit the victim's role. In civil-law systems,
20 Following this presentation the Yugoslav Tribunal did take custody of Milosevic, who
now faces trial in three separate indictments. See Suzanne Daley, A Full Charge of Genocide for
Milosevic N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24,2001 at A8.
21 But see MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE 222-23 (1997) (acknowledging criticism of
decision to try Taic yet arguing that he was "an ideal subject for the first trial," because the
litigation not only helped the tribunal build "a pyramid of evidence leading to the principals
ultimately responsible for the horrors in Bosnia" and "to work out the kinks in its procedures,"
but also gave some redress to some victims).
22 A 1988 statistical survey concluded that suspects were arrested in only 3 million of
about 34 million serious crimes in the United States in 1986. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN A FREE SOCIETY, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS 4-5
(1988).
23 GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE 300 (2000) (referring to
estimates that of "at least 100,000 perpetrators of the Holocaust" - and perhaps five times that -
by 1948, "only 3,500 Germans had been tried (not just for murdering Jews but for other war
crimes, too)").
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victims may join criminal litigation as parties civiles.24 The ad hoc tribunals do
not permit this; nor do they award reparations as part of punishment.25
What about pacification? The claim that international criminal
adjudication effects peace is somewhat breathtaking, and belied by the
prolongation of conflict in the Balkans.
These shortcomings need not compel us to scrapping the whole project.
Though international criminal adjudication alone may not fulfill any of these
purposes, it yet may constitute one among several means to restoring civil
society. Moreover, international criminal adjudication serves at least one
other, important purpose. It provides a forum for enunciating societal
condemnation of atrocities, a forum for making an historical record.
These condemnatory purposes have been explicitly embraced. Again I
quote Jackson's opening statement at Ntirnberg. He spoke at the outset of a
multistate effort to bring to account twenty-two surviving leaders of the Nazi
regime. They included top-echelon army, naval, and air force commanders;
leaders of the security forces and the Hitler Youth; cabinet ministers; and
Nazi ideologues. Despite the infamy of these "Major War Criminals,"
Jackson told the judges:
Merely as individuals their fate is of little consequence to
the world.
What makes this inquest significant is that these
prisoners represent influences that will lurk in the world
long after their bodies have turned to dust. We will show
them to be living symbols of racial hatreds, of terrorism and
violence, and of the arrogance and cruelty of power. They
are symbols of fierce nationalism and of militarism, of
intrigue and war-making which have embroiled Europeans
generation after generation, crushing its manhood,
destroying its homes, and impoverishing its life. 26
Later, Jackson said, "What these men stand for we will patiently and
temperatdy disclose. We will give you undeniable proofs of incredible
24 See Richard Vogler, Criminal Procedure in France, in COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 14, 25-27 (John Hatchard, Barbara Huber & Richard Vogler eds., 1996) (describing
role of partie civile in France).
25 The ICC, however, would permit victims' legal representatives to address it. ICC
Statute, supra note 1, art. 68(3). Its statute also provides for awards of reparations. Id., art. 75.
2 Jackson Statement, supra note 11, at 99:
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events. The catalog of crimes will omit notling that could be conceived by a
pathological pride, cruelty, and lust for power." 27
In these excerpts Jackson revealed an almost palpable desire to establish
the record of World War II. He promised to expose not only the men on trial,
but also the forces of evil that had fomented war and war crimes. Racism,
power-mongering, nationalism, and militarism were to stand trial, no less
than the defendants themselves. Guilt was to be established through
"undeniable proofs." Thus future generations could not deny what had
occurred, and might even learn from the tragedies of the past.28
Today's international criminal judges articulate similar goals. Antonio
Cassese, the first President of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, has written that in
international criminal trials, "a fully reliable record is established of atrocities
so thatffuture generations can remember and be made fully cognisant of what
happened." 29 The same tribunal wrote, in an oft-quoted portion of a 1996
opinion, that it "sees public reprobation and stigmatisation by the
international community, which would thereby express its indignation over
heinous crimes and denounce the perpetrators, as one of the essential
functions of a prison sentence. ..."30
These comments endorse what certain theorists call the expressive
nature of governmental action. 31 Theories of expressivism analyze the
message of a governmental act, such as a prosecution or a sentence to
punishment. They are concerned not so much with the message that is
conveyed or intended by the people speaking, but rather with the message
that is understood by the people who hear it. Expressive theories posit that
the act of doing something, without more, may yield an expressive harm or
an expressive good.
In the domestic arena, U.S. constitutional doctrine disfavoring
establishment of a state religion is said to exemplify the expressive
component of the law. 32
2 Id.
28 See BASS, supra note 23, at 301-04 (contending that postwar trials precluded denial of
atrocities).
29 Antonio Cassese, Reflections on International Criminal Justice, 61 MOD. L. REV. 1, 1 (1998)
(emphasis in original).
30 Erdemovic Sentencing Judgement, supra note 16, para. 65.
31 On expressivism, see generally, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes,
Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L REv. 1503 (2000); Dan M. Kahan,
The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413 (1999).
3 See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 31, at 1546-60.
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For instance, placement of a Christian cross on a government seal
conveys a message that non-Christians are unwelcome. The seal constitutes
a governmental expression. Within a constitutional framework of religious
tolerance, that expression, even if unaccompanied by affirmative acts
excluding non-Christians, constitutes a harm in and of itself.
Expressivism has not been studied much in relation to international law,
yet it may have particular utility in that arena. Much of international
criminal law for the last fifty years was nothing but expression, in the form of
treaty after treaty defining certain behavior as criminal.33
There was virtually no enforcement in the fifty years after Nuirnberg.
Once enforcement resumed, it retained its original expressivist flavor, as
international criminal tribunal judges expressly wrote that their rulings were
meant to convey indignation.
To a U.S. lawyer, emphasis on the expressive aspect of prosecution might
seem highly unorthodox, even discomforting. There is a feeling in the
United States that defendants ought not to stand as examples, as scapegoats,
for other criminals. Preferred is the language of deterrence, assertions that
prosecution of one individual in fact dissuades other from committing
crimes. Such assertions do not convince. They may, in fact, mask a value-
laden, expressive basis for the decision to prosecute certain conduct or to
levy a certain sentence. 34 Furthermore, even in the United States, one
occasionally reads of a prosecutor exhorting a jury to convict with words like
these: "You must send a message. Punish this person to send a message."35
Thus even in the United States, the notion that criminal adjudication can
express condemnation is not new.
What is new is the priority that international criminal tribunals attach to
this role. Thus in in 1998, the Yugoslavia Tribunal reaffirmed that expression
and denouncement are "essential functions" of international criminal
3 See generally M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & EDWARD M. WISE, AuT DEDERE Aur JUDIcARE:
THE DUTY TO EXTRADITE OR PROSEcUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1995) (compiling treaties
defining behavior that violates international criminal law).
34 See Kahan, supra note 31, at 435.
M See, e.g., Vail Skier Guilty in Fatal Crash, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2000, at A13 (reporting
that during trial of skier eventually found guilty of criminally negligent homicide for causing
death of a skier with whom he collided, "[pirosecutors had urged the jury - made up of skiers
and snowboarders - to send a message that reckless skiing will not be tolerated"); Teen Convicted
in Fairfax Slaying, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 1991, at C03 (quoting state prosecutor who urged jurors
"to send a message that the Fairfax community would not tolerate what 'smacks of a drive-by
shooting"').
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adjudication. 36 It then proceeded to list three aims of international criminal
adjudication. Retribution and deterrence of course were mentioned.
Sandwiched in between them, as an equal partner, was "stigmatisation," or
expression of moral condemnation. 37
How valuable is this expressive role of international criminal
adjudication?
Certainly, international criminal adjudication may foster development of
an historical record. Indeed, it may have value that cannot be found in other
recordmaking forums, such as truth commissions or civil lawsuits. In many
truth commissions, victims make statements in proceedings apart from
perpetrators. Perpetrators may in fact never come before the commission,
perhaps because a blanket grant of amnesty has eliminated any incentive to
disclose past wrongdoings. In contrast, in a criminal trial the accusers and
the accused confront each other face to face, in a proceeding focused on
determining what happened in a precise situation. To the extent that there is
power in anecdote, the narrative developed in the discrete trial may have
more power.
Trials, moreover, are solemn events. Witnesses typically give evidence
under oath, and judgments carry lingering effects. Even more than in civil
litigation, criminal trials embody the sternest majesty of government. To
brand someone a "criminal" carries a stigma more searing than the brand
imposed by any other forum. Finally, criminal proceedings individuate
guilt. They name as criminals identifiable individuals, rather than all
members of a group. That individuation may help reconstruction by
removing guilt from others.38
These benefits ought not to justify indiscriminate use of this tool, because
international criminal adjudication also impedes record-making. Judge
Cassese described the record that would emerge as "fully reliable."39 In fact,
what emerges out of international criminal proceedings is likely to be a
constructed, fragmentary truth.
36 Furundzija, supra note 12, para. 289, reprinted in 38 I.L.M. at 374-75 (speaking of
"reprobation and stigmatisation") (citing Erdernovic Sentencing Judgement, supra note 16, para.
65).
37 Id., para. 290, reprinted in 38 .L.M. at 375.
38 See Martha Minow, The Work of Re-Membering: After Genocide and Mass Atrocity, 23
FORDHAM IN'rL L.J. 429, 430-31 (1999).
39 Cassese, supra note 29, at 1.
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On this point too Niirnberg is instructive. Justice Jackson had promised
to "omit nothing" from the "catalog of crimes."40 But he omitted much,
admitting elsewhere in his statement that he would focus on "the Common
Plan or Conspiracy" to wage aggressive war, and not on "the individual
barbarities or perversions which may have occurred independently of any
central plan." 4' Thus the Nirnberg prosecution included and excluded
evidence in accordance with its theory of the case, and chose particular
defendants to represent different aspects of the Nazi regime.42 The judgment
of International Military Tribunal undertook a further construction of the
record. As one example, the prosecution had wanted crimes against
humanity to include all that the Jews had suffered under Nazi rule.43 The
tribunal said no. Though it described various events as "revolting,"
"horrible," as events that "must not be forgotten," the tribunal refused to
define prewar incidents as violations of international law.44 Similarly,
defense counsel wanted to present the Versailles Treaty as one of the causes
of the Nazi rise to power; the tribunal excluded that evidence as irrelevant.45
As in other criminal proceedings, the evidence on which the tribunal
ultimately based its decision had survived a process of selection involving all
actors in the litigation.46 This form of selectivity renders the record made in
an international criminal trial incomplete.
Selectivity, and randomness, also engender a separate problem: the risk
of slippage into unfair show trials. Only a small number of individuals ever
will face trial before an international criminal tribunal. Those defendants
inevitably come to stand in the shoes of many others who escape criminal
process. In Jackson's own words, the defendants become "living symbols" of
evil; their fates may have less "consequence to the world" than the fact that
by punishing them, society gives voice to its own outrage.47 There is obvious
danger in using individual human beings to represent the wrongs done by
others. Such scapegoating invites unfairness to the person on trial. Jackson
40 Jackson Statement, supra note 11, at 99.
41 Id. at 104; see also id. at 142.
42 See TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALs 85-90 (1993).
4 See Jackson Statement, supra note 11, at 118-30.
4 United States v. Goering, Judgement (Int'l Mil. Tribunal Sept. 30, 1946), reprinted in 6
F.R.D. 69,130 (1946).
4 See Herbert Kraus, The Nuremberg Trial of the Major War Criminals: Reflections After
Seventeen Years, 13 DE PAUL L. REV. 233, 235 (1964).
46 See generally Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren
and Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185,197-202 (1983) (discussing reconstruction
of facts in criminal proceedings).
47 Jackson Statement, supra note 11, at 99.
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himself, to justify convictions that some believed violated the principle of
legality, made this disturbing argument:
I cannot subscribe to the perverted reasoning that society may advance
and strengthen the rule of law by the expenditure of morally innocent lives
but that progress in the law may never be made at the price of morally guilty
lives.48
One does not find such disregard of due process in the opinions of the ad
hoc tribunals; still, some of its rulings have stirred concern. Most notable was
its decision withholding the identity of certain witnesses, and thus thwarting
defense efforts to investigate the witnesses' credibility. 49
International criminal adjudication is, in short, a powerful but dangerous
instrument. It ought not to be viewed as some grand and ultimate cure for
the ills of a ravaged society. Rather, international criminal adjudication
should be used only when a specific context warrants. Consideration not
only of its potential, but also of its limitations, is necessary. Because of the
risk of injustice, international prosecution ought to be pursued only when it
would serve a complex of objectives and purposes. When it would do little
more than develop a representative record or express condemnation, it
should be shunned in favor of a less repressive tool, like a truth commission.
Even as we apply circumspection in our use of international criminal
adjudication, we should strive to improve the process. Recognizing the
problems of randomness and selectivity, we should select, and seize, those
believed to be most culpable. To cabin the inevitable symbolism of the
process, we should not settle for defendants, like Mr. Tadic, who cannot
shoulder that symbolism. We should consider creative reparations, orders of
restitution, to victims. And we should make fairness a priority. One of the
great defects of today's international criminal tribunals is the absence of a
defense organ, which stymies development of a knowledgeable and zealous
defense bar.50 There is great need in the realm of international criminal
adjudication for consistency, for entrenchment of principles, for uniform
rules.
48 Id. at 147.
49 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber Decision on the
Prosecutor's Motion Requesting Protective Measures (Aug. 10,1995), reprinted in 7 CRIM. L.F. 139
(1996). For further discussion on this and other fairness concerns, see Diane Marie Amann,
Harmonic Convergence? Constitutional Criminal Procedure in an International Context, 75 IND. L.J.
809, 848-51 (2000).
so See Diane Marie Amann, The Rights of the Accused in a Global Enforcement Arena, 6 ILSA
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 555, 564-65 (2000).
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The United States, and other countries, did the right thing by signing the
Rome Treaty a couple days ago. A permanent ICC is an essential step
toward the consistency necessary so that international criminal adjudication
properly may serve as one, though not the only, means to societal
reconstruction.

